Global Update
Shield of the Americas' Submit Outcome
When I evaluate the Shield of the Americas summit in Doral, I see both opportunity and risk. The adoption of the Doral Charter signals a serious attempt to formalize hemispheric cooperation on security, migration management, and strategic infrastructure. I support meaningful cooperation in the Western Hemisphere. The United States should not retreat from regional leadership. However, leadership must be exercised through diplomacy and partnership—not through structures that drift toward centralization or exclusion.
The Americas face real challenges: irregular migration, transnational criminal networks, economic instability, and weak institutions in parts of the region. These problems demand coordinated solutions. But coordination must not become coercion, and cooperation must not become conditional political alignment. A hemispheric framework that implicitly divides nations into insiders and outsiders would undermine long-term stability. Regional unity cannot be built on pressure; it must be built on mutual respect and shared responsibility.
I believe firmly that this initiative must remain inclusive of every nation in the Western Hemisphere. Open communication should extend even to countries that disagree with U.S. policy positions. Negotiation is not a concession—it is a strength. Exclusionary models risk recreating bloc politics that fracture the region and weaken trust. If this effort becomes authoritative in practice rather than collaborative, it will lose legitimacy and effectiveness.
While I recognize these risks, I remain cautiously supportive because I have long believed the United States should play a far more active economic and strategic role throughout the Americas. Since the end of the Cold War, I have argued that American engagement should deepen, not shrink. Regional stability is in our national interest.
Importantly, the solution to illegal immigration cannot rely solely on enforcement. Strengthening partner nations is essential. Economic development, institutional stability, infrastructure investment, and trade partnerships reduce the root causes of migration. When countries across the hemisphere are stronger and more prosperous, pressure on our borders decreases naturally. We must acknowledge that instability in the region contributes to migration flows, and therefore we must be part of the solution.
For these reasons, I support hemispheric cooperation—but only if it remains diplomatic, inclusive, and voluntary in nature. The Shield of the Americas has potential, but its success will depend entirely on whether it builds partnership across the entire hemisphere rather than consolidating authority within a narrower coalition.
If it expands opportunity, respects sovereignty, and welcomes dialogue with all nations, it can strengthen the region. If it becomes rigid or exclusionary, it risks deepening divisions. My position is therefore clear: strong American leadership, active hemispheric engagement, economic partnership, and unwavering commitment to inclusivity. That is the path that best serves both regional stability and U.S. national interests.
Shield of the Americas' Summit
The upcoming Shield of the Americas Summit scheduled for March 7 at Trump National Doral Miami raises a number of questions about both its purpose and its long-term impact on regional diplomacy. While the concept is framed as a new approach to hemispheric security cooperation, the limited number of participating countries suggests that it may function more as a political coalition than a truly regional initiative.
Several major powers in the Western Hemisphere—including Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, and Venezuela—are not expected to participate. Without those nations, any agreement on migration, counter-narcotics operations, or regional security would have limited reach. Cartel activity and migration flows move through multiple countries, meaning that excluding some of the most influential states in the region could undermine the effectiveness of any proposed security framework.
Another issue is the appointment of Kristi Noem to a key role connected to the initiative. Her tenure leading the United States Department of Homeland Security was widely criticized and marked by a number of controversies. That record raises legitimate questions about whether she is the right choice to represent a complex diplomatic effort involving multiple governments and sensitive security issues.
There are also unanswered structural questions. Will this initiative involve joint military operations, intelligence cooperation, or simply political commitments? Who will oversee the implementation of any agreements that come out of the summit? And will Congress or other institutions have oversight over potential U.S. commitments?
Until those questions are addressed, the summit may generate headlines, but it remains unclear whether it will produce meaningful long-term cooperation or simply deepen divisions within the hemisphere.
Ecuador’s ask for help.
When I look at Ecuador asking for help on March 2, 2026 to confront narco-terrorism, I cannot help but think back to the 1980s, when Bolivia and Colombia requested U.S. assistance to combat powerful drug cartels. On the surface, the situations feel similar to me: sovereign nations facing internal crises tied to narcotics trafficking reaching out for support to stabilize their governments and protect their citizens. In both periods, drug organizations threatened not just public safety but political institutions and economic order.
However, I also see important differences. In the 1980s, U.S. involvement in Bolivia and Colombia unfolded within the broader Cold War context. Counter-narcotics efforts were often intertwined with counterinsurgency strategy and fears about communist influence. In my view, that geopolitical layer complicated motives and sometimes blurred the line between law enforcement support and military intervention.
Today, when a country like Ecuador formally asks for help, I see a framework that is more transparent and structured around bilateral agreements and international law. Assistance now often emphasizes intelligence sharing, technology, training, and logistical support rather than large-scale troop deployments. There is also far more public scrutiny and oversight than there was decades ago.
To me, the most significant factor is sovereignty. When a nation requests assistance, it changes the legal and diplomatic posture. The real question I ask is not simply whether we help, but how that help is defined, limited, and supervised to ensure it supports stability without creating new long-term complications.
Iran War
No political spin, my opinion as a former Military Intelligence Analyst.
When I studied the Iran–Iraq War, many years ago. I was struck by how long and destructive it was. The war lasted nearly eight years, beginning on September 22, 1980, when Iraq invaded Iran, and ending with a United Nations–brokered ceasefire on August 20, 1988. It became one of the longest conventional wars of the twentieth century.
The human cost was staggering. Estimates vary, but Iran is believed to have lost between 200,000 and 500,000 lives, including soldiers and civilians. Overall casualties on both sides likely exceeded one million when deaths, injuries, and prisoners of war are included.
In the end, neither Iran nor Iraq achieved a decisive victory. Borders largely returned to their prewar lines, leaving both nations economically drained and socially scarred after years of intense fighting and loss.
When I look at the possibility of a war with Iran today, I believe it is important to be realistic about what it would involve. If the objective were true regime change rather than limited strikes, I think it would likely require boots on the ground. History shows that air campaigns alone rarely remove governments or stabilize countries long term. Sustained ground forces are typically needed to secure territory, dismantle institutions, and maintain order.
At the same time, I worry that continued bombing without a broader strategy could lead to significant civilian casualties, especially in densely populated areas. Iran’s geography, size, and population would make any extended conflict complex and dangerous. From my perspective, the human cost — both military and civilian — would need to be seriously considered before any escalation beyond limited military action.
As what has happened in many campaigns over the last 50 years I see no clear plan or goal of an end game. With all this said I am totally opposed to the actions already taken and any further actions.